Download e-book for kindle: Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures by Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover

By Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover

ISBN-10: 3642204406

ISBN-13: 9783642204401

Either theoretical and empirical elements of unmarried- and multi-winner vote casting tactics are awarded during this choice of papers. ranging from a dialogue of the underlying rules of democratic illustration, the amount contains a description of an excellent number of balloting methods. It lists and illustrates their susceptibility to the most balloting paradoxes, assesses (under a number of versions of voters' personal tastes) the chance of paradoxical results, and discusses the relevance of the theoretical effects to the alternative of vote casting method.

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Additional info for Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures (Studies in Choice and Welfare)

Sample text

131). 1 Example Suppose there are 11 voters whose preference orderings among four candidates, a; b; c, and d , are as follows: No. b c d a b/. Suppose further that all the voters always vote sincerely for their preferred candidate in each round, and that the order in which the divisions are carried out is as follows: In round 1: d against a; In round 2: the winner of round 1 against c; In round 3: the winner of round 2 against b; Given this order d beats a (6:5) in the first round, c beats d (6:5) in the second round, and b beats c (8:3) in the third round and becomes the ultimate winner.

Of voters 1 1 1 Preference ordering a b d c b d c a d c a b and in district II there are four voters whose preference ordering among the four candidates are as follows: No. S. Felsenthal If the order of divisions in each district is: b vs. d in round 1 Winner of first round against a in round 2 Winner of second round against c in round 3 Then in each district c will be the ultimate winner. However if, ceteris paribus, the two districts are amalgamated into a single district of seven voters, then d becomes the Condorcet winner and will therefore be elected under the successive elimination procedure – in violation of the reinforcement postulate.

Of voters 2 3 1 3 Preference ordering a b c b c a c a b c b a 3 Review of Paradoxes Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate 39 Here a (rather than b) is eliminated in the first round, and b beats c in the second round. Thus the a b c voters obtained, ceteris paribus, a better outcome when two of them did not participate in the election than when all of them participated in the election thereby demonstrating the no-show paradox. This example demonstrates also the vulnerability of the plurality with runoff procedure to the (weak form) of the twin paradox.

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Electoral Systems: Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures (Studies in Choice and Welfare) by Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover

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